The article studies macroeconomic effects of reducing oil export duty, depending on various development scenarios for oil refining sector and the implemented economic policy measures in the framework of neoclassical general equilibrium model for the Russian economy. Relevance of the work is based on the fact that oil export duty subsidises both oil refining industry, allowing it to exist in the market with low efficiency compared with foreign producers, and petroleum customers, which translates into a lower cost of petroleum products as compared to the world prices. Our paper mainly focuses on a comparison of the different effects of the tax manoeuvre on the abolition of oil export duty. The positive effects can arise from increase in the efficiency of the oil refining industry, which the abolition of export duty on crude oil should create incentives for. The negative effects on the economy are mainly related to the appreciation of the prices for the most important factors of production — oil and petroleum products, which can lead to a loss in competitiveness of Russian non-energy export. The transition process to the new efficient technologies is set exogenously in the model. It is expected that the abolition of oil export duty will force companies to carry out the modernisation of production process. In this case, we build scenarios with gradual reduction of tariffs in 5–7 years that should not lead to the collapse in the domestic petroleum products market in the short run due to the inability of certain enterprises rapidly switch to the new technologies. It is shown that in the current economic environment with low oil prices, this tax reform can be virtually painless for the economy. At the same time, if considered economic policy measure will force the oil refining industry to modernise its production facilities, there will be a positive effect on output in the economy and the welfare of domestic economic agents in the long run.

Keywords: oil export duty, tax reform, DSGE model for the Russian economy.

JEL: E17, E27, E62, F41, F47, H2.

Andrey V. Zubarev, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), the Centre for Economic Modeling of Energy and Environment of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (82, Vernadskogo prosp., 117517, Moscow, Russian Federation).                                                                                                                                                                          E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

Andrey V. Polbin, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), the Centre for Economic Modeling of Energy and Environment of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (82, Vernadskogo prosp., 117517, Moscow, Russian Federation); head of the Macroeconomic Modeling Department of the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy (3–5, Gazetny per., 125009, Moscow, Russian Federation).                                                                                                       E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it , This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

The recent restructuring of the economy has led to the fact that the leaders of information technology sector — Apple, Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Amazon — became the largest companies in the world, replacing the banking and oil and gas sectors. The emergence of a large number of technology start-ups resulted in the increase of the entrepreneurial ownership. Business founders tend to issue dual class stocks to retain control over key corporate decisions. The capital structure and the Board of Directors structure alter along with changes in the ownership structure. In many large companies, more than 90% of directors have become independent. At the same time, the diversification of the board of directors is improving by the active involvement of women in decisionmaking processes. Zero debt popularity reflect the changes in the attitude to risk. The article examines the main trends in the ownership structure of the largest US companies. The research consolidates the results of theoretical and empirical research in the field of corporate governance, capital structure and ownership structure in the developed markets. We provide the analysis of the dispersed ownership as the element of Anglo- Saxon corporate governance model based on historical trends in the ownership structure of companies in the US. The appearance of new sectors, the rapid development of entrepreneurial ownership, the return of the popularity of dual class shares, the fashion for gender diversification in the board of directors and the phenomenon of zero debt level are illustrated by case studies of actual corporations and analytical reports. We discuss all of the identified trends in terms of risk. In order to hedge the higher business risks of new sectors the top management and investors reduce debt, invite women to the board of directors and increase the degree of independence of the board of directors.

Keywords: ownership structure, capital structure, risk level, the Board of Directors, ownership concentration.

JEL: G32, G34.

Maria S. Kokoreva, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), associate professor, department of finance, Corporate Finance Center, National Research University Higher School of Economics (26, Shabolovka ul., Moscow, 119049, Russian Federation).
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Anastasia N. Stepanova, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), associate professor, department of finance, National Research University Higher School of Economics (26, Shabolovka ul., Moscow, 119049, Russian Federation).
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Elena V. Karnoukhova,National Research University Higher School of Economics (26, Shabolovka ul., Moscow, 119049, Russian Federation).                                                                                                                                                            E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

The article presents the results from a study of investment attractiveness of small and medium-sized businesses in the period from 2013 to Q3 2016. It reveals some changes in the mood of business representatives in the period of 2015–2016 due to the recession impact and the purchasing power decrease, as well as due to the high dependence of businesses on private consumption. The empirical research data shows a decline in business profitability and cost management quality downtrend caused by the influence of several factors such as the ruble collapse in December 2014 (‘Black Tuesday’) and the subsequent liquidity squeeze. The 2014 research results indicate that the level of investment attractiveness of small business is the same in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other regions of Russia. However, the business value that reflects its usefulness to the owners is much lower in the regions outside Moscow and St. Petersburg. This is due to lower expectations for the return of the capital invested than in the Russian largest cities. The article examines a mechanism of collective investments (equity crowdfunding) in the private business and describes its advantages and disadvantages. This mechanism can stimulate the flow of private investments and expansion of the domestic capital market. According to the Central Bank, the market size of the equity crowdfunding borrowings in Russia is only 52,5 mln rubles in 2015, while according to the Massolution’s report an estimated volume of global investments is 34 bln dollars, which is another confirmation of the fact that in Russia this mechanism is still in its infancy. To make this mechanism effective, it is necessary to form a legal framework that can help to protect the private investors’ interests, provide the P2B lending market regulation and ensure good access for individuals.

Keywords: collective investments, small business, domestic capital market, the profitability of the investment.

JEL: L26, L53, C7.

Boris B. Bogoutdinov, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), CEO Consulting company «2B Dialog» LLC (34–60, Polbina ul., Moscow, 109388, Russian Federation).
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Alexander L. Barannikov, Cand. Sci. (Tech.), Associate Professor of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)(84, Vernadskogo prosp., Moscow, 119571, Russian Federation).
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The forming features of markets with network effects including the software markets are essentially important for effective business models in various spheres of business activity. First of all, it is connected with understanding of network effect and reasons of its use which are key factors not only commercial success of products and services, but also forming of adequate measures of economic policy, including antitrust. The article describes the case against Google, Inc. and Google Ireland Limited company (affiliated company) on suspicion of violation of the Russian antitrust law. The market of the pre-installed applications for OC Android localized for Russia which represents the market with network effects is a subject of the economic analysis. The signs of antitrust violation include the characteristics of the multilateral markets, in particular a platform (app store of Google) on the sides of market without which very difficult to create and support directly the product at the market. Namely bundling or tying which can be considered as equivalent of excluding agreement to create barriers on the market for the potential newcomer. The description of similar cases like the case against Google, Inc. corporation and the Google Ireland Limited company, and also the case against the Microsoft company which showed all difficulties of law application in the field of monopolization constraint (in terms of USA antitrust law) or abuse of dominance (in terms of European antitrust legislation) have the opportunity to show the fact that such decisions can be justified in principle.

Keywords: the Russian antitrust law, abuse of dominance, tying, market with multilateral network effects, platform, Google.

JEL: K21, L41, L42.

Gyuzel F. Yusupova, Associate professor, Faculty of Economic Science, National Research University Higher School of Economics (28/11, buld. 9, Shabolovka ul., Moscow, 119049, Russian Federation).                                                E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

The article is devoted to the quantitative assessment of interrelation between corruption and competition. The authors summarize the results of theoretical and empirical studies of the relationships, as well as conducting their own assessment based on international data. The results show that the relation in the two-way one. On the one hand, increasing intensity of competition leads corruption behavior to become more prevalent. On the other hand, corruption oppresses competition, thus causing additional negative effects on social welfare. The last effect, however, is pronounced for countries with low and moderate bureaucratic barriers. If the barriers are high, the effect becomes opposite: corruption may support competition. Thus, reduction and facilitation of bureaucratic procedures is an important measure of the state policy aimed to reduce corruption and promote competition. The study revealed no statistically significant impact of income per capita on intensity of competition and the level of corruption in the country. The hypothesis that increase in freedom of mass media restrains corruption is also rejected. Thus there is no reason to consider this tool as an effective measure of anti-corruption policies. An important factor influencing both variables, is the development of institutions (property rights protection, the efficiency of the judicial system and law enforcement agencies). This result is consistent with the results of theoretical and empirical studies of other authors and emphasizes the importance of developing institutions to achieve both the goal of reducing the level of corruption and the development of competition in the domestic market.

Keywords: competition policy, anti-corruption policy, institutions, bureaucratic barriers.

JEL: D02, D40, D41, D73.

Svetlana V. Golovanova, Dr. Sci. (Econ.), professor, National Research University Higher School of Economics (25/12, B. Pecherskaya ul., Nizhniy Novgorod, 603155).

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Anna I. Meleshkina, Competition and Economic Regulation Research Center, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (82, Vernadskogo prosp., 117517, Moscow, Russian Federation). E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

The underinvestment in the specific assets due to the “hold up” is one of the key issues in the theory of the firm. Till the very end of the twentieth century discussing the “hold up” problem researchers considered only the so-called “selfish” relation-specific investments. But later their attention was switched to the analysis of another specific investments type, named “cooperative” or “cross” investments, which is much more risky than the selfish investments. Besides that, the riskiness of such investments depends on their specifity degree — the specific investments can be partly specific or full specific. In its turn, the degree of specifity determined by the partners’ ability to benefit from selfish or cooperative specific investments in contacts with “alternative” contractors. If such gains equal zero, that specific investments (cooperative or selfish) are full specific to the “main” partner. Respectively, if the gains from partnership with “alternative” contractors are more than zero, that such specific investments are partly specific to the “main” partner. Unfortunately the present regulatory documents, determining the application the rule of reason, don’t take into account the character of specific investments. The negative consequences of such approach are illustrated in the first part of the article, where the court’s decision in case of Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS (PFDC) v. Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence, Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi is analyzed. The second part of the article is dedicated to the discussion of possible solutions of this problem.

Keywords: cooperative relation-specific investments, vertical restraints, antitrust, rule of reason, e-commerce.

JEL: B52, E22, G11, K21.

Maria Е. Agamirova, Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Lecturer, National Research University — Higher School of Economics (20, Myasnitskaya ul., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation).                                                                                                         E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

Nataliya B. Dzagurova,Cand. Sci. (Econ.), Associate Professor National Research University — Higher School of Economics, (20, Myasnitskaya ul., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation).                                                                           E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

The article compared results of economic development in terms of market mechanisms and centralized planning, based on an analysis of key indicators of the domestic and North American railroads for the century-long period. It was revealed that the higher and more sustainable dynamics of volume indicators, achieved in certain periods in a centrally planned economy does not show its advantages in comparison with the market economy, which is characterized by cyclical. It is shown that on the basis of centralized planning and control can not be implemented the strategy of “catching up development”. At the same time it found that the degree of success ensuring productive use of various resources in the framework of centralized planning and control is inversely proportional to their importance in the modern economy. This demonstrates the impossibility of the effective implementation of such methods of economic management. In conditions of market relations ensured advancing more efficient use of the main economic resource of our time — human capital. It is showing positive results of economic reforms in the railway transport. Made the conclusion about the necessity of development of market mechanisms and institutional framework (in particular, the removal of restrictions on the involvement of private capital in the development of the existing rail infrastructure) for the successful solution of problems of the Russian railway sector and the entire economy.

Keywords: catching-up development, economic dynamics, market economy, centrally planned economy, rail transport.

JEL: L92, N70, P19, P29, R49.

Dmitry А. Macheret, Dr. Sci. (Econ.), professor, Moscow State University of Railway Engineering of Emperor Nicholas II (MIIT)(9 bldg. 9, Obraztsova ul., Moscow, 127994, Russian Federation).

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The work aims to assess how the current methodology of distribution of equalization transfers between Russian regions preserves incentives for the development of regional economies. To answer this question the term “stimulus” is clarified and proposed indicator which allows to judge not only about the presence or absence of an incentives to develop the regional economy, but also allows to quantify its assessment. This indicator is a degree of substitution of increase of tax and non-tax revenues by reduction of equalization grants, which shows how the value of equalization transfers changes with different tax capacity of the region. The hypothesis of the presence of a sufficient amount of incentives, which, at first glance, contradicts to popular belief about its absence, is based on the list of elements and features of the existing methodology of distribution of equalization transfers between Russian regions, which contribute to the preservation of such incentives. This hypothesis is confirmed by the results of calculations. Based on calculations of the effect of changes in tax capacity of regions on the value of these transfers for the period 2006–2015 it is shown that for the most of regions the level of this compensation is less than half, which means there are significant incentives for regions to develop their economy and revenue base budget. This stimulating effect was different for the regions with the original level of fiscal capacity before to the distribution of equalization grants below or above 0.6: for the latest it is significantly higher. The paper also considers different factors connected with the increase in revenue capacity negatively affecting the net financial effect on the budget of the region.

Keywords: equalization transfers, fiscal capacity, tax capacity, incentives for regional development.

JEL: H77.

Alexander N. Deryugin, Acting Head of the Laboratory for Fiscal Policy Studies of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (82, prosp. Vernadskogo, Moscow, 119571, Russian Federation). E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

The perspective to stimulate the regional government efficiency in the sphere of investment attraction and an entrepreneurship development has the escalating importance for Russia in the context of need to intensify new “points of growth” of national economy. An article’s subject is the methodology and a technique of assessment and stimulation of the territorial management by means of the National investment rating of the Russian Federation. In the article the National investment Rating is argued as an instrument of stimulation of territorial subjects development by providing efficiency of regional management teams in the Russian Federation. To argue this proposition, in article the requirement of looking for new methods of region government’ stimulation within the concept of economic deregulation is staticized; methodological and methodical bases of National Investment Rating are stated; experience of implementation of the Investment Standard and Rating for 2012–2015 is analised; the directions of development and risks for the Rating and the Standard are revealed and estimated in the context of stimulation efficiency of regional government teams. The hypothesis of a possibility to use Rating as the mechanism of assessment and stimulation of management teams efficiency in territorial subjects of the Russian Federation regardless of social and economic conditions in which the region is made. The methodology of a research is constituted: concepts of economic deregulation and stimulation of management teams activities; methods of the factorial, statistical, comparative and correlation analysis, scientific interpretation of “field” researches results.

Keywords: regional economy, investment attraction, entrepreneurial climate, competitiveness of regions, assessment of the investment climate, effective government management of the region.

JEL: H11, O43, R11, R58.

Andrey S. Nikitin,Ph.D. (Econ.), associate Professor. The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (84, Vernadskogo prosp., Moscow, 119571, Russian Federation).                                           E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

In the article in detail is studied the process of tax harmonization in the EAEU by analyzing the main economic indicators, as well as the legal aspects of the tax systems in order to identify similarities and differences in the EAEU and the impact of harmonization of tax policy on the EAEU Member Countries. There are general regulation for indirect taxes such as VAT and duty taxes which defines the main principles of using these taxes during the export and import processes. However, there are not any regulations on EAEU level for direct taxes, although some main features such as tax rates and base of PIT and CIT in EAEU Member States have lots of common features. Also, it was found out that the structure of EAEU Member States’ economics differs a lot which leads to a huge difference between the amount and share of tax revenue and tax burden in Member Countries. In the end of the article the main principles and methods for tax harmonization in EAEU are suggested based on the results of the analysis and the experience of tax harmonization in EU.

Keywords: harmonization of tax legislations, regulation of direct and indirect taxes in EAEU, tax rates, tax burden.

JEL: JEL: E62, E63, H20, H87, K34.

Heghine G. Petrosyan, E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it

The article analyzes the theoretical basis and specified methodological approach to the research of cultural objects to optimize its financing arrangements. It presented 3 methodologically different approaches to the research of the culture economy: from the point of the principles of methodological individualism, methodological principles of holism and sociodynamics theory. In each approaches the author analyzes the basic tendencies of development of the sphere of culture, chooses the priority sources of this sector`s financing and focuses on specific groups of cultural goods consumers making funding decisions sphere of culture. It notes the existence of the mutation`s phenomenon of public support for culture institutions in the private Institute of budgetary funds charity. It provides 3 approaches to the financing of the cultural sphere. As part of the methodological individualism financing mass culture at the cost of cultural goods consumers and elite culture at the expense of charity. Based on the position of methodological holism cultural sphere financed solely by the state. In the frame of the theory sociodynamics culture financing is part of a public-private partnership. At the same time the state must bear the costs of preservation and development of cultural goods and the private sector — the costs of public cultural services. The author concludes that the scientific basis for the level of spending on culture, that should identify the factors which will determine the reduction or increase of these costs. It proposes an algorithm research culture facility management processes to solve this problem. The construction of this algorithm is based on the approach to cultural facilities as one of the specific types of goods — ward goods. From the specificities and their characteristic “price illness” it grounds institutional changes which aims to creating a mechanism of public-private partnership in the sphere of cultural objects financing through endowment funds and other types of partnerships. This institution should ensure the growth of costs on culture by attracting funds from patrons.

Keywords: culture economy, cultural heritage, public sector, public goods, prices illness, institution of administration

JEL: H41, H50, Z10, Z11.

Vladimir V. Tarnovskii, Head of Territorial authority of Ministry of Culture in Privolzhsky Federal District (32, Varvarskaya ul., Nigniy Novgorod, 603006, Russian Federation).                                                                                              E-mail: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it